Group 5

Methods

Uniswap specific Commit & Reveal

The Uniswap specific commit-and-reveal scheme utilizing hash commitments works in two phases: commit and reveal. In the commit phase, users submit a hashed version of their transaction, concealing the actual transaction details. This hash acts as a commitment to a specific transaction without revealing its content. Later, in the reveal phase, users disclose the actual transaction details for execution. Thus, the transaction only becomes visible after it has been ordered on-chain.

For more information read the paper:
Mitigation of Transaction Manipulation Attacks in UniSwap
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Lib-Submarine

The Lib-Submarine commitment protocol is a commit-reveal scheme that temporarily conceals transactions. Participants send a non-refundable amount of currency to a specially generated address. This address is derived using a hash function that combines the address of the target contract, the participant's address, a randomly selected witness (key), and any other relevant data. This method effectively hides the transaction's target and purpose until it is intentionally revealed, ensuring the confidentiality of the transaction's intent during the entire period.

For more information read the paper:
Enter the Hydra: Towards Principled But Bounties and Exploit-Resistant Smart Contracts

Time-lock puzzle

Time-lock puzzle commitments work by encrypting data with a puzzle that takes a predetermined amount of time to solve. These puzzles are designed to be inherently sequential, meaning they can't be sped up significantly through parallel processing. The key to decrypt the data is essentially the solution to the puzzle. This setup ensures that the encrypted information can only be accessed after a specific duration, making it a secure method for timing the release of sensitive or time-sensitive information.

For more information read the paper:
Time-lock puzzles and time-release Crypto

Multi-Party Timed Commitments

The MPTC model facilitates secure, simultaneous revelation of secret values by multiple parties at a predetermined time. This is achieved through a protocol where each participant commits to a value that is hidden and locked in a cryptographic puzzle. These puzzles are designed to take a roughly equal amount of time to solve, ensuring fairness and preventing premature revelation. When the predetermined time arrives, all parties work to solve their puzzles, leading to the simultaneous unveiling of all committed values. This model is particularly useful in scenarios requiring time-sensitive, secure, and fair revelation of information, such as sealed-bid auctions or blockchain transactions.

For more information read the paper:
Multi-Party Timed Commitments

F3B

The F3B protocol employs threshold cryptography, where users encrypt their transactions for confidentiality. These transactions are then securely decrypted by a decentralized secret-management committee only after finalization. This approach ensures that pending transactions remain private, effectively shielding them from potential front-runners. F3B is compatible with current smart contracts and has minimal latency impact in Ethereum networks.

For more information read the paper:
F3B: A Low-Overhead Blockchain Architecture with Per-Transaction Front-Running Protection

Fino

The Fino protocol, designed to protect against MEV attacks in cryptocurrency platforms, operates on a DAG structure. It incorporates a BFT consensus mechanism while maintaining the efficiency of DAG's transaction dissemination. Fino utilizes a commit-reveal scheme with minimal messaging overhead. This approach doesn't rely on complex secret sharing or threshold encryption, making it less resource-intensive.

For more information read the paper:
Maximal Extractable Value Protection on a DAG

FairPoS

The FairPoS protocol is designed to address front-running issues in DeFi by ensuring input fairness in permissionless consensus systems. It employs delay encryption to protect client inputs, making them inaccessible to potential adversaries before finalization. This approach prevents input ordering attacks, allowing for equitable transaction processing.

For more information read the paper:
FairPoS: Input Fairness in Permissionless Consensus

On-Chain Commit & Reveal

Positives

Negatives